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TAKINGS, TRADE SECRETS, AND OFF-PATENT 
BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS 
ANDREW WASSON1  
ABSTRACT 
Biologics are complex medicines which are often genetically 
engineered, and which are sure to play an important role in curing 
some of humankind’s worst diseases.  Not surprisingly, generic 
companies want a part of the biologic market. The FDA believes 
that it has the authority to approve off-patent versions of biologics 
that were originally regulated under the Food, Drug & Cosmetic 
Act, but in order to effectively do so the FDA would have to rely on 
findings based on data produced by the brand name companies.  
This iBrief examines whether the FDA’s reliance on previous 
findings would give rise to a valid claim under the Takings Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution.  In the end, it concludes that the FDA’s 
proposed action likely would not constitute a taking.     
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Many of the most promising advances in medicine belong to a class 
of compounds called biologics.  Biologics are complex, large molecules that 
are often created by recombinant DNA technology.2  One prominent 
example of a biologic is Amgen’s Epogen®, a genetically engineered form 
of erythropoietin which combats anemia by stimulating the production of 
red blood cells.3  Sales of Epogen® during the second quarter of 2004 
topped $633 million.4  Indeed, the total market for biologics in 2003 has 
been estimated at $30 billion and is projected to reach $60 billion by 2010.5  
¶2 The research and development costs associated with biologics are 
high because biologics are structurally complex and difficult to 
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2 The Law of Biologic Medicine: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 
108th Cong. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, 
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manufacture.6  One industry leader, Genentech, estimated that it has 
invested $6.4 billion in research over the last 28 years.7  Amgen, in one year 
alone, spent $1.7 billion on research.8  These high costs are then passed on 
to consumers, who often foot bills for biologic treatments ranging anywhere 
from $10,000 to $25,000 a year.9  In some rare cases, costs can exceed 
$170,000 per year.10 
¶3 However, consumers may see reduced costs for biologic treatments 
once many of the key biologic patents expire.  Indeed, many of these key 
patents are approaching expiry.11  In the past, one important way that 
Congress has successfully lowered prices for consumers is through 
encouraging generic competition.12  The Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act of 1984,13 which is generally known as the Hatch-
Waxman Act, amended the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).14  The 
Hatch-Waxman Act encouraged market entry of generic drugs by 
establishing an abbreviated pathway for generic approval.  By most 
accounts, the Hatch-Waxman Act has been successful at walking the fine 
line between encouraging generic competition and respecting the 
intellectual property rights of brand-name innovators.15     
                                                     
6 Id. at 5 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, member, Subcomm. on the 
Judiciary).   
7 Citizens Petition Regarding Standard of "Similarity" or "Sameness" of 
Biotechnology-Derived Products, 3 (2004p-0171, Apr. 8, 2004) [hereinafter 
Citizen’s Petition] available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/apr04/040904/04p-0171-cp00001-
01.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).  
8 See Hearing, supra note 2, at 80 (statement of David Beier, Senior Vice 
President, Global Government Affairs, Amgen, Inc.). 
9 Id. at 117 (statement of Carole Ben Maimon, President and Chief Operating 
Officer, Barr Research, Inc.). 
10 Id. 
11 Christine Hines, Clock is Ticking on Several Lucrative Drug Patents; 
Generic Drug Makers Want Their Shot at a $10 Billion Market, 26 NAT’L L.J.,  
No. 45 (2004), at 11.  
12 CONG. BUDGET OFF., HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS 
HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 13 
(1998) (estimating that consumers saved somewhere between 8 and 10 billion 
dollars through buying generic pharmaceuticals in 1994 alone).   
13 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 
355 (2000); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000)). 
14 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000). 
15 FED. TRADE COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT 
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY (2002) (noting loopholes but generally affirming 
success), but see Sarah Eurek, Hatch-Waxman Reform and Accelerated Market 
Entry of Generic Drugs: Is Faster Necessarily Better?, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. 
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¶4 The approval of generic, or off-patent,16 biologic treatments is more 
complicated because most biologics are not approved under the FDCA, but 
rather under the Public Health Services Act (PHSA),17 which does not 
contain any provision regarding generic approval.18  Without this sort of 
provision in the PHSA, a manufacturer of an off-patent biologic is required 
to submit to the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) independent clinical 
studies that support the manufacturer’s assertion that the product is safe and 
effective.19  Requiring the manufacturer to provide its own complement of 
studies may be warranted in some situations, but in other cases the data may 
be identical to the data originally supplied by the innovating company.20  
This submission of duplicative data by the off-patent company is inefficient 
and delays the price-lowering benefits of competition.  
¶5 Aside from statutorily shortening the approval process, several 
scenarios have been formulated to speed off-patent biological products to 
market.  One scenario envisions that the FDA could interpret a provision for 
generic approval into the existing PHSA.21   Another possible scenario sees 
the FDA reclassifying biologics as drugs and applying the Hatch-Waxman 
Act.22  A third scenario is that the FDA could apply the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
only to the small set of biologics that were originally approved under the 
FDCA.23   
                                                                                                                       
REV. 18 (2003) (for an account of how Hatch-Waxman was recently amended in 
response to loopholes).   
16 “Generic” and “off-patent” refer to the same proposition with regard to 
biologics, but usage has been a contentious matter since both terms have similar 
yet unique connotations. At root is the empirical question of whether generic 
biologics truly exist, since biologics are dependent so heavily on the 
manufacturing process.  Brand name firms contend that the term generic is 
inapplicable and prefer the broader, more catch-all, off-patent.  Generic firms 
contend the opposite.  This remains an open question and this paper attempts to 
remain impartial.  See Hearing, supra note 2 (response to follow-up questions 
by William B. Shultz, representing the Generic Pharmaceuticals Association). 
17 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2000).  
18 Christine Hines, Pressure Rises for FDA, Congress in Latest Drug Duel; 
Generic, Brand-name Drug Makers Face Off Over the Future of Biologics, 
LEGAL TIMES, Jul. 12, 2004, at 1.   
19 See id.  
20 See Hearing, supra note 2, at 2-3 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).   
21 See DONALD O. BEERS, GENERIC AND INNOVATOR DRUGS: A GUIDE TO FDA 
APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS §13.03 (Supp. 2003).   
22 See Hearing, supra note 2, at 119 (prepared statement of Carole Ben-Maimon, 
Barr Laboratories).   
23 See Melissa R. Leuenberger-Fisher, The Road to Follow On Biologics: Are 
We There Yet?, 23 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 389, 390 (2004).     
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¶6 While the FDA has refused to apply the Hatch-Waxman Act to 
biologics that were originally approved under the PHSA,24 the FDA 
believes that it has the authority to approve off-patent biologics originally 
regulated under the FDCA.25  However, under this scenario, by approving 
the off-patent biologic the FDA would need to rely on the previous finding 
of safety and effectiveness associated with the brand name biologic.  
According to brand name firms, this action is a use of trade secret data, and 
that such use by the FDA would violate the Takings Clause of the 
Constitution.26  
¶7 This iBrief analyzes the takings argument.  In doing so it examines 
the United States Supreme Court’s takings case law, and puts particular 
focus on Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto.27  In Monsanto, the Court examined 
how the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution applies to trade 
secrets and government regulation; its analysis turned on whether a 
company had “reasonable investment-backed expectation.”28  In the end, 
this iBrief concludes that it would be difficult for brand name firms to prove 
that they had “reasonable investment-backed expectations” in their safety 
and effectiveness data, such that the FDA could not rely on these earlier 
findings in order to approve off-patent equivalents of biologics which were 
originally approved under the FDCA.29  
I. THE REGULATION OF DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS 
¶8 The regulatory framework for approving and monitoring medicines 
is complicated and rarely intuitive.  Thus, it is valuable to provide a short 
orientation to the regulatory process.  The FDCA requires that new drugs 
undergo close scrutiny for safety and effectiveness before they can reach the 
                                                     
24 21 C.F.R. § 314.101(e)(1).
25 See Hearing, supra note 2, at 134 (prepared statement of Dr. David Crawford, 
Acting Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration). 
26 See Citizen’s Petition, supra note 7, at 1;  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
27 467 U.S. 986 (1984).   
28 Id. at 1005.  
29 It is important to be candid about what this iBrief does not purport to argue:  
whether data used to support biologics passed under the PHSA can be relied on 
by the FDA to approve off-patent biologics under the Hatch-Waxman provisions 
of the FDCA.  Indeed, brand name biologics might have a strong case for a 
takings claim in light of the lack of any generic provision in the PHSA coupled 
with multiple assurances by the FDA against this sort of treatment.  Lastly, a 
word of caution, even though it might not be a taking to evaluate a select 
number of biologics already regulated under the FDCA, it still may be unwise to 
do so.  New legislation may be the better course for several reasons, including 
the development of a clear legislative record and an unambiguous and simplified 
process for generic approval. 
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market.30  Drugs are defined under the FDCA in part, as “articles intended 
for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease 
in man or other animals” and also as “articles (other than food) intended to 
affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.”31   
Drugs are evaluated and approved by the Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research at the FDA.32   
¶9 Biologics, on the other hand, are regulated under the PHSA and are 
evaluated by the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER).33  
It has been noted, however, that the FDCA’s definition of a drug is so broad 
that it actually encompasses most biologics.34  Indeed, some biologics like 
insulin and human growth hormone are already regulated by the FDA under 
the FDCA.  However, these delegations to the FDA are merely the result of 
historical practice and are not supported by any scientific rationale.35    
¶10 The idea of relying on the safety and efficacy of first generation 
drugs to shorten the approval process of generic drugs did not begin with 
Hatch-Waxman.36  For example, applicants were allowed to rely on a 
finding of effectiveness for pre-1962 drugs under the Drug Efficacy Study 
Implementation program (DESI).37  However, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
provided a more elaborate system of generic approval.38  First, under 
§505(j), an applicant is permitted to file an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA).39  Under this section, generic manufacturers are not 
required to duplicate the safety and effectiveness studies performed by the 
brand name innovator if several statutory requirements are satisfied.40  One 
of the most important requirements is a showing of bioequivalence between 
the generic and brand name product.41  However, unlike chemically-
                                                     
30 See JAMES T. O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION §13.4 (2004). 
31 21 U.S.C. §321(g)(1) (2000); See also Jay M. Zitter, What is “Drug” Within 
§201(g)(1) of the Food, Drug, And Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C.A. 321(g)(1)), 127 
A.L.R. FED. 141 (for a detailed examination of the contours of the definition of 
“drugs”). 
32 FDA, Intercenter Agreement Between the Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research and the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, III(A)(6) (Oct. 
31, 1991) [hereinafter Intercenter Agreement].    
33 See id.   
34 Edward L. Korwek, Human Biological Drug Regulation: Past, Present, and 
Beyond the Year 2000, 50 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 123, 126 (50th Anniversary 
Special Issue, 1993).   
35 See Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 23, at 391.    
36 Id. at 389.   
37 Id.  
38 See id. at 389-90.   
39 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).   
40 Id.  
41 Id.  
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synthesized drugs, where a showing of bioequivalence is relatively 
straightforward, proving bioequivalence between biologics is fraught with 
difficulty.42  Due to the unique physical properties of biologics, additional 
clinical studies may be necessary to prove bioequivalence.  Therefore, using 
§505(j) of the FDCA, which requires strict bioequivalence, may not be 
appropriate to approve off-patent biologics.43   
¶11 Section 505(b)(2) of the Hatch-Waxman Act44 holds more promise 
for off-patent biologics, since it provides a more flexible approach to 
accommodating similar but not identical compounds. 45  Again, since brand 
name and off-patent biologics are unlikely to be completely bioequivalent,  
off-patents cannot benefit from 505(j).46 Yet, to the extent there is 
bioequivalence under §505(j), the off-patent biologic applicant can rely on a 
previous finding of safety and effectiveness under §505(b)(2).47  Where no 
bioequivalence exists, the off-patent applicant must supply data that 
independently supports safety and effectiveness.48  The FDA cannot fill 
gaps by delving into the proprietary data of the first generation drug.49  The 
FDA contends that there is a legally significant difference between relying 
on the finding of safety and effectiveness as occurs when bioequivalence is 
proven under §505(j), versus relying on the underlying data itself.50          
II. TRADE SECRETS AND THE TAKING CLAUSE 
¶12 To answer whether the FDA’s reliance on a finding of safety and 
effectiveness constitutes a taking with regard to off-patent biologics, it is 
necessary to review the Supreme Court’s treatment of the Takings Clause.  
The Takings Clause, found in the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, protects property interests of private parties against 
uncompensated government interference.51  A takings claim must be 
grounded in some legal property right, such as a right to trade secret 
                                                     
42 Lincoln Tsang & Donald Beers, Follow-on Biological Products: The 
Regulatory Minefield, GLOBAL COUNSEL LIFE SCIENCES HANDBOOK 109 (2004).  
43 Id.  But see Hearing, supra note 2, at 119 (written statement of Carole Ben 
Maimon, Barr Laboratories; arguing for approval of generic biologics under 
§355(j)).   
44 21 U.S.C. §355(b)(2).   
45 See Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 23, at 394-95.  See also Tsang & Beers, 
supra note 42, at 110.   
46 Tsang & Beers, supra note 42, at 109.   
47 FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, APPLICATIONS COVERED BY SECTION 
505(B)(2) (DRAFT GUIDANCE) 2-3 (1999) [hereinafter DRAFT GUIDANCE].   
48 See Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 23, at 394-95. 
49 See Hearing, supra note 2, at 65 (Questions to Dr. David Crawford).   
50 Id.  
51 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”). 
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protection, based on either a state or federal statute.52  Many state laws 
follow the Restatement of Torts or the Uniform Trade Secrets Act in 
defining property interests.53  Indeed, the FDA has relied on the 
Restatement for its definition of trade secret:54 “A trade secret may consist 
of any commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used 
for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade 
commodities and that can be said to be the end product of either innovation 
or substantial effort.”55  Courts have also construed the definition of trade 
secret more narrowly, depending on the legislative context.56   
¶13 It is conceivable that the Takings Clause does not recognize trade 
secrets as a property right.57  One argument against trade secrets as a 
property right is that the right to exclude in trade secrets is narrower than for 
other types of property: a trade secret holder cannot prevent competitors 
from using the once-secret if it was independently discovered58  However, 
the Court has, in at least one instance, determined that trade secrets are a 
property right subject to the Takings Clause.  In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,59 
the statute in question was the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).60  FIFRA was passed in 1947 as a labeling and 
licensing statute for pesticides, but was expanded in 1972 pursuant to fears 
about the safety of pesticides and the possible harm that they posed to the 
environment.61  Among other changes, the 1972 legislation authorized the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to rely on trade secrets or other 
                                                     
52 Ira S. Matsil, Comment, Government Seizures of Trade Secrets: What 
Protection Does the Takings Clause Provide?, 48 SMU L. REV. 687, 698 (1995). 
See also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, at 1001 (1984) (“[P]roperty 
interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and 
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from 
an independent source such as state law.” (quoting Webb's Fabulous 
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)). 
53 See Matsil, supra note 52, at 698.   
54 Richard Fortunato, Note, FDA Disclosure of Safety and Efficacy Data: The 
Scope of Section 301(j), 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1280, 1289 (1984).   
55 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(a) (2004).   
56 See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food and Drug Admin., 704 
F.2d 1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1983).   
57 See Richard Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets Under 
the Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 59 (2004) (presenting, but ultimately 
rejecting, an argument that trade secrets are not property).    
58 Id.  See also Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1011.   
59 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
60 61 Stat. 163, as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 et seq. (2000).  
61 Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 991-92. 
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confidential information to approve similar chemical compounds if the 
beneficiary agreed to compensate the original innovator.62       
¶14 The 1972 amendments spurred litigation about the extent of trade 
secrets and other confidential information, and FIFRA was amended yet 
again in 1978.63  The 1978 amendments provided that the EPA could not 
rely on innovator data for ten years after the date of submission.64  
However, after the ten years had passed, the EPA could rely on that data 
without permission.65  Further, compensation for use of this data was 
required only for 15 years after the date of submission.66   
¶15 The Court in Monsanto held that the safety and effectiveness data 
submitted by Monsanto to the EPA was a property interest cognizable by 
the Takings Clause insofar as the information was protected by the laws of 
Missouri as a trade secret.67  As the Court explained, trade secrets derive 
their economic value from the competitive edge which they provide.68  
Once they are disclosed, or used to evaluate other applications, their 
economic value is extinguished or diminished, and the holder might have a 
claim under the Takings Clause.69  Applying the Court’s reasoning, it will 
be assumed for the purposes of this iBrief that brand name safety and 
effectiveness data are trade secrets and subject to a takings analysis.  
¶16 However, the question does not end there.  For regulatory takings, 
the government action also needs to be evaluated in light of the ad hoc 
factors formulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York.70  The Penn Central Court set forth several factors relevant to whether 
a taking has occurred:  the character of the government action, the economic 
impact of the action, and whether the government action has vitiated 
reasonable investment-backed expectations.71   
¶17 While not dispositive,72 the reasonable investment-backed 
expectations inquiry is often the central focus of a regulatory takings 
analysis.73  Reasonable investment-backed expectations played a prominent 
                                                     
62 Id. at 992-93. 
63 Id. at 993-94. 
64 Id. at 1006. 
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 1003-04.   
68 Id. at 1012.   
69 Id.  
70 438 U.S. 104 (1978).   
71 Id. at 124.   
72 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 635-36 (2001) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (reasonable investment-backed expectations should not be relied on 
exclusively).   
73 E.g., Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005.   
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role in Monsanto, a situation strikingly similar to the present debate.  In 
both situations, the government was concerned with ensuring public safety 
in the face of potentially dangerous but valuable compounds.  Brushing 
aside the first two Penn Central factors, the Monsanto Court focused its 
analysis on whether the agency action disrupted Monsanto’s reasonable 
investment-backed expectations.  The Court reasoned that whether or not 
expectations were disrupted depended on the statutory scheme.74  The Court 
held that the existence of a statute puts an innovator constructively on notice 
of the limits of an agency’s authority with regard to the handling of 
confidential information.75  The Court placed emphasis on the voluntary 
submission of data: “[A]s long as Monsanto is aware of the conditions 
under which the data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally related 
to a legitimate Government interest, a voluntary submission of data by an 
applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of a registration can 
hardly be called a taking.”76 Thus, a taking does not occur when there is a 
voluntary exchange of information for a valuable government benefit and 
the government provides notice that it has a license to use or disclose the 
submitted information.77   
¶18 This is a double-edged sword, however, since legislation affording 
protection to certain forms of information will require compensation if 
agency action violates the letter of the law.78  The Court held that with 
regard to data submitted after the 1978 amendments, Monsanto could not 
have a reasonable investment-backed expectation that its data would not be 
treated as inviolate, since the statute explicitly stated that the data would not 
receive such treatment.79  Similarly, before 1972, the statute was silent 
about the agency’s obligations and provided no “express promise” to an 
innovator.80  However, under the 1972 amendments, applicants were given 
the opportunity for compensation by labeling data as confidential.81 
Therefore, with regard to the time period after 1972 but before 1978, the 
Court did find that Monsanto could have reasonable investment-backed 
expectations of nonuse and nondisclosure.82   
                                                     
74 See id. at 1005-07.  
75 Id. at 1007.  
76 Id.  
77 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987) 
(discussing Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007). 
78 Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1010-11.  
79 Id. at 1006.   
80 Id. at 1008.   
81 Id. at 1011.   
82 Id. at 1010-11.  
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III. DO BRAND NAME BIOLOGIC MAKERS HAVE “REASONABLE 
INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS”?  
¶19 Within even the broader “muddle”83 of takings case law, the 
reasonable investment-backed expectations test has been characterized as 
“at best useless and at worst mischievous.”84  Indeed, numerous attempts 
have been made to clarify the concept and give it analytical teeth.85  For 
better or worse, however, the reasonable investment-backed expectation 
notion of Penn Central is still used frequently by the Court.86  
¶20 Attempts to determine whether there are reasonable investment-
backed expectations in a given situation can proceed in one of two 
fashions.87  A bottom-up analysis begins with investor expectations and then 
evaluates reasonableness.  Indeed, expectations can be evaluated by risk 
analysis,88 or under a competing view, through evaluating the web of social 
and historical understandings about property rights.89  Both assays are too 
complicated to complete meaningfully in this iBrief.  By contrast, a top-
down analysis begins with the statutes that shape expectations and evaluates 
whether or not they provide notice.  While in theory, top-down and bottom-
up approaches should yield the same result, the situation at hand admits 
more easily to a top-down analysis, since it is more feasible to analyze the 
notice-giving effect of statutes.90  
¶21 Legislative schemes that shape expectations and provide notice can 
come in three varieties.91  Legislation can prohibit use or disclosure, provide 
for use or disclosure, or remain silent on the issue.92  If legislation prohibits 
the use or disclosure of the trade secret, the holder has a strong case for a 
taking if the government acts contrary to the statute.93  At the other end of 
                                                     
83 Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the 
Fifth Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529, 529 n. 1 (1998).   
84 See Epstein, supra note 57, at 65.   
85 See generally David R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking 
Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215 (1995) (providing a survey of different approaches in 
analyzing the reasonable investment-backed expectations test).   
86 See generally David R. Mandelker, The Notice Rule in Investment-Backed 
Expectations, in  TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
PERSPECTIVES 21 (Thomas E. Roberts, ed. 2002).  
87 See Mandelker, supra note 85, at 227.  
88 Id. at 227-30 (describing Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 524 (1986)).   
89 Id. at 230-32 (describing Richard H. Pildes, Conceptions of Value in Legal 
Thought, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1520, 1552 (1992)).  
90 Id. at 227-31.  
91 See Matsil, supra note 52, at 707.   
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
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the spectrum, if legislation affirmatively provides for the disclosure or use 
of trade secret information, the trade secret holder is put on notice, and 
consequently has no claim under the Takings Clause.94  Finally, if 
legislation is silent about the use or disclosure of trade secrets, then it may 
be appropriate to look to the circumstances at the time the trade secret was 
submitted, including regulations.95     
A. Is there notice for the use of trade secret information for biologics 
approved under the FDCA? 
¶22 Does the FDCA provide explicit notice that the FDA will not rely 
on earlier findings of safety and efficacy in approving later applications for 
biologics originally approved under the FDCA?  If the FDCA provides such 
notice, then any action against the statute will constitute a taking.  Critics of 
off-patent biologics have asserted that the FDCA expressly provides for the 
protection of data under section 301(j).96  Section 301(j) prohibits, in 
relevant part,  
the using by any person to his own advantage, or revealing, other than 
to [certain government officials and the courts, relevant], any 
information acquired under the authority of [a number of FDCA 
sections, including §505] concerning any method or process which as 
a trade secret is entitled to protection.97     
The FDA also requires those who accept a commission with the Department 
of Health and Human Services to affirm that they will not, “use this 
information to further [their] private interests or the interests of any other 
person.”98  It is conceivable that the FDA’s reliance on brand name data 
would fall under the ambit of §301(j) if that section is given a broad 
interpretation.  The argument is that §301(j) prohibits the FDA from 
approving an off-patent biologic application because relying on its earlier 
finding of safety and effectiveness is a use of data prohibited by the 
statute.99  While the FDA may not be using the information “for its own 
advantage” it could be contended that they are furthering the interests of 
another person; namely, the applicant for the off-patent biologic. 
 
                                                     
94 Id. at 707-08.   
95 Id. at 710-14. 
96 See Citizens Petition, supra note 7, at 12. 
97 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (2000).  
98 Food and Drug Administration, Regulatory Procedure Manual, Ch. 3, 
Commissioning State and Local Officials, Acceptance of Commission, page 30 
(2004).   
99 See Citizens Petition, supra note 7, at 12-13.  
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¶23 Thus, it becomes critical to examine what “uses” are contemplated 
by §301(j).  Unfortunately, attention to the “use” prong of §301(j) has been 
scant at best;100  most of the scrutiny has focused on the second prong which 
prohibits disclosure.101  Most often, §301(j) is seen as a stopgap to agency 
discretion for disclosure pursuant to Freedom of Information Act102 
requests.103  The exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act remove 
trade secrets from mandatory disclosure but still allow discretionary 
disclosure as authorized by law.104  Yet even this discretion is foreclosed 
because under §301(j) trade secrets are prohibited from disclosure and 
therefore not authorized by law.105   
¶24 This discussion about biologics brings to the surface a disturbing 
contention: that even Hatch-Waxman’s generic drug approval process 
affects an unconstitutional taking.106  Reading §301(j) broadly to include the 
approval of follow-on applications as “a use to its own advantage” would 
extend beyond FDCA-approved biologics, like insulin and human growth 
hormone, to all drugs.  The shortened approval process in either 
circumstance could be characterized as the FDA using pioneer data for the 
advantage of another.  In this way, such a broad reading could frustrate the 
aims of both §505(b)(2) and §505(j).  Indeed, no suit has been filed by a 
drug manufacturer asserting that the Hatch-Waxman Act violates the 
Takings Clause.107   
¶25 It seems most reasonable to construe §301(j) narrowly to 
encompass a smaller subset of cases, such as the situation where an agency 
employee, privy to confidential information, uses this information to 
advance the interests of her brother-in-law, an aspiring investor.  It is a 
canon of statutory construction that “[a] statute should be construed so that 
effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy 
                                                     
100 S. Rep. 73-493 (1934) (only commenting that this section is a safeguard to 
manufacturers).  
101 See, e.g., Fortunato, supra note 54.  
102 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).  
103 See Fortunato, supra note 54, at 1282. 
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
106  See DONALD O. BEERS, GENERIC AND INNOVATOR DRUGS: A GUIDE TO FDA 
APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS 6-1 (1999) (arguing that the Hatch-Waxman Act might 
be a taking, but no mention of §331(j)). 
107 Id. at 6-1.  There might be two reasons for this.  First, brand name companies 
may not believe that their data is actually being used.  Second, they might 
believe that there is use, but because of the exclusivity and patent term extension 
benefits, they may believe that compensation already exists.   Regardless, as a 
matter of construction, Section 301(j) would be at odds with §§505(b)(2) and (j) 
either way. 
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another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error.”108 On 
the other hand, a narrow reading preserves the substance of both terms.109  
Thus, with regard to §301(j), by construing use and “to his own advantage” 
narrowly, the substance of §301(j), §505(b) and §505(j) can be preserved.110  
Therefore, while there is ample room for argument, it seems safe to say that 
the FDCA does not provide an explicit promise that a finding of safety and 
effectiveness for one FDCA-approved biologics application cannot be used 
as a basis for the approval of a follow-on application.111   
B. Does the FDCA affirmatively enable FDA action? 
¶26 Since there is no explicit guarantee in the FDCA that the FDA 
cannot rely on previous findings, the next question is whether the FDCA 
affirmatively enables FDA action.  Sections 505(j) and, in theory, 505(b)(2) 
of the FDCA could be cited to support this view.  Both of these sections 
enable, to different degrees, the FDA to rely on earlier findings to approve 
generics with the limitation that the original application be approved under 
the §505 pathway of the FDCA.112  Section 505(j) allows a generic drug 
manufacturer to take advantage of an Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(ANDA) if, among other statutory requirements, the generic drug is 
bioequivalent to the brand name drug.113  In an ANDA application, the 
generic applicant is not required to submit studies demonstrating safety and 
effectiveness.114  Section 505(b)(2) is similar to the ANDA pathway, 
however, it allows for greater flexibility.115  A generic applicant is allowed 
to rely on a finding of safety and effectiveness to the extent that the two 
                                                     
108 Anderson v. Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 944 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(quoting J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 at 
104 (C. Sands 4th ed. rev. 1984)). 
109 See id.  
110 Similar reasoning was used by the court in Public Citizen Health Research 
Group v. FDA,  704 F.2d 1280, 1288-89 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The canon was used 
to construe the meaning of trade secrets narrowly in the context of the Freedom 
of Information Act.   A broad construction would engulf the substance of 
“commercial information”, which was also protected in the statute.     
111 See also Letter from John C. Yoo, Professor of Law, representing the Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association, to Sen. Orrin Hatch 9-10 (Oct. 21, 2004) (also 
arguing that 301(j) does not create reasonable investment-backed expectations).   
112 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.101(e)(1) (2004).  
113 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).   
114 Id.  
115See Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 23, at 394-95; see also Tsang & Beers, 
supra note 42, at 110. 
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compounds are bioequivalent; to the extent that they are not, the generic 
applicant must submit data demonstrating safety and effectiveness.116   
¶27 By their language, Sections 505(j) and (b)(2) apply to all drugs.117  
In this way, these provisions would apply to insulin and human growth 
hormone, since even though they would be considered biologics under a 
rough definition, they were approved under the FDCA, and are referred to 
as drugs.118  Indeed, there is nothing within Section 505(j) or (b)(2) that 
indicates that those sections only apply to drugs which admit to a 
straightforward classification.119  Thus, it seems that the existence of both 
statutes should put brand name manufacturers on notice that the FDA will 
rely on previous findings for certain biologics classified as drugs.        
C. Is there another basis for investment-backed expectations? 
¶28 Even if the appropriate legislation is silent or unclear, regulations 
can still shape reasonable investment-backed expectations.120  In TriBio 
Laboratories, Inc. v. United States,121 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit held that a government regulation created reasonable 
expectations when it required that data from a first generation application 
could not be used to support a follow-on application unless the original 
submitter had consented.122  In TriBio, a pharmaceutical manufacturer 
attempted to obtain approval for a veterinary pharmaceutical called 
Gentaject, which was used for inoculating one day -old chicks against 
harmful bacteria.123  Reasonable investment-backed expectations were 
created in light of a regulation relating to New Animal Drug 
Applications.124   That regulation stated that, “any reference to information 
furnished by a person other than the applicant may not be considered unless 
its use is authorized in a written statement signed by the person who 
submitted it.”125  A similar provision applies to New Drug Applications 
under the Hatch-Waxman Act, providing that an applicant can only 
reference data in a previous application when it obtains a right to reference 
that data from the submitter.126  
                                                     
116 21 U.S.C. §355(b)(2);  see also Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 23, at 394-
95. 
117 21 U.S.C. §355(j), (b)(2). 
118 See Intercenter Agreement, supra note 32, at III(A)(6).   
119 21 U.S.C. §355(j), (b)(2). 
120 Tri-Bio Labs., Inc. v. United States, 836 F.2d 135, 140-41 (3d Cir. 1987). 
121 836 F.2d 135 (3rd Cir. 1987). 
122 Id. at 140-41.  
123 Id. at 136.   
124 Id. at 140-41.  
125 21 C.F.R. § 514(a) (1987).  
126 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(g)(3) (2004). 
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¶29 However, this provision does not create reasonable expectations 
regarding the non-use of a finding of safety and effectiveness.  The 
approval-shortening measures put in place by the Hatch-Waxman Act 
specifically provide for situations where the new applicant does not have a 
right to reference the data in the brand name application.  In other words, 
even though an applicant does not have a right of reference, 505(b)(2) still 
provides a framework for the FDA to rely on previous findings of safety 
and effectiveness.  No comparable statute existed for animal drugs in Tri-
Bio.127  Section 505(b)(2) provides that when there is no right to reference, 
an applicant can obtain approval, but only if further statutory requirements 
are met.128  Under §505(b)(2), as described above, the FDA is authorized to 
rely on previous findings of safety and effectiveness, without actually 
delving into the data of the first application.129  On the one hand, investors 
would have reasonable investment-backed expectations that the FDA would 
not allow an off-patent applicant to rely on an innovator’s application to 
“fill gaps” in the off-patent application.  On the other hand, investors would 
not have reasonable expectations, grounded in regulation, that the FDA 
would not rely on a finding of safety and effectiveness when the applicant 
did not have a right to reference, in light of §505(b)(2).   
CONCLUSION 
¶30 The high prices of biologic therapies make it imperative that 
generic or off-patent products be marketed as options for consumers after 
patent and exclusivity protections for manufacturers have expired.  Brand 
name companies argue that the FDA cannot make off-patent biologics 
available without using proprietary data protected by the Takings Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution.  A Takings analysis here hinges on whether the 
property holders had reasonable investment-backed expectations concerning 
the confidentiality of their information for biologics classified as drugs 
under the FDCA.  This iBrief argues that § 301(j) of the FDCA did not 
create expectations of confidentiality.  Furthermore, sections 505(j) and 
(b)(2) actively created expectations that the FDA would rely on previous 
findings of safety and effectiveness.  Lastly, the FDA has not promulgated 
any regulations that that create reasonable expectations about 
confidentiality.  Consequently, it is unlikely that the approval of off-patent 
biologics originally approved under the FDCA would be a taking.  For this 
subset of biologics, brand name manufacturers had notice, under the Hatch-
Waxman amendments, that the FDA would consider follow-on products in 
light of previous safety and effectiveness findings.130   
                                                     
127 Tri-Bio, 836 F.2d at 139.   
128 See DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 47, at 2. 
129 See Hearing, supra note 2, at 65 (questions to Dr. David Crawford).   
130 See supra, note 29. 
